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How to Instruct the Jury on Stipulations of Fact in Federal
Criminal Cases
Linsey K Hogg'
ABSTRACT

While courts agree on how to instructjuries on stipulationsoffact in the federal
civil context, there is no consensusin the federalcriminalcontext.' The onlySupreme
Court case addressingfact stipulationsin the federal criminalcontext is Old Chief
v. United States.! It holds that, in felon-in-possession cases, a court abuses its
discretion when it admits the full recordofpriorconviction when the name or nature
of the prior offense unfairlyprejudices the defendant and outweighs itsprobative
value.' Old Chief is a narrowholding, limited only to cases involving proofoffelon
status, and fails to address or provide guidance as to how a federaljudge should
instruct thejury after admittinga fact stipulation.'

J.D. Candidate 2018, University of Kentucky College of Law. The author would like to thank
Professor Sarah N. Welling for her words of encouragement, advice, constructive criticism, mentorship,
and, generally, everything. The author would also like to thank the Sixth Circuit Committee on Pattern
Criminal Jury Instructions for expanding my knowledge of federal criminal law and for allowing me to
converse with the committee regarding stipulations of fact.
2 See infra Part I.
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997).
4 Id. at 190-92; FED. R. EVID. 403 ("The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value
2
is substantially outweighed by. . . unfair prejudice."); see also 18 U.S.C. § 92 (g)(1), (9) (2012) ("It shall
be unlawful for any person who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or
affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.").
s See infra Part II.
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INTRODUCTION

Stipulations of fact are routinely used in federal criminal cases and range from
undisputed immaterial facts that are easily proven to facts establishing an element of
the offense.' Stipulations of fact promote judicial efficiency, save adversarial parties
time and money, and simplify the trial process by allowing parties to focus only on
contested issues.' Although stipulations of fact are frequently used in federal criminal
proceedings, surprisingly little discussion of stipulations of fact exist in either the
common law or in secondary literature.
Courts generally agree that stipulations of fact are binding on the parties, court,
and on appeal.' Nevertheless, due to the routine use of stipulations of fact, judges
often face the task of determining how to instruct and properly convey the binding
effect of a stipulation of fact to juries.'o Federal judges must determine whether the
binding nature of the stipulation of fact extends to the jury such that it necessitates
a mandatory or permissive jury instruction. If a judge finds that a mandatory
instruction is necessitated, then the judge will instruct the jury that they must accept
the stipulated fact conclusively proved. Alternatively, if a judge finds that a
permissive instruction is necessitated, then the judge will instruct the jury they should
or may accept the stipulated fact as conclusively proved.." Despite agreement over
the binding effect of stipulations of fact, presently, federal courts of appeals disagree
over the proper way to instruct jurors, with some circuits using a mandatory
instruction and others using a permissive instruction.' 2
This lack of consensus is problematic because a federal judge's determination of
how to instruct a jury as to stipulations of fact arguably plays a crucial role during
jury deliberation." Jurors' duties include determining the facts from the evidence and
applying the law to those facts. 4 The jurors' application of the law to the adduced
6

See infra Part I.
See infra PartI.

8

See, e.g., United States v. Muse, 83 F.3d 672, 680 (4th Cir. 1996) ("We have been unable to find

much guidance in the case law; indeed, no appellate case seems to have set forth proper language for a jury
instruction [in instances where a stipulation encompasses an element of the crime].") (footnote omitted).

' See, e.g., United States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378, 1386 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Stipulations freely and
voluntarily entered into in criminal trials are as binding and enforceable as those entered into civil actions."

(citing United States v. Campbell, 453 F.2d 447, 451 (10th Cir. 1972))); United States v. Griffith, No.
92-6106, 1993 WL 492299, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 29, 1993) ("The law in the Sixth Circuit on the effect of
a stipulation of fact is clear: 'Stipulations voluntarily entered by the parties are binding, both on the district
court and on [the appeals court].'" (quoting FDIC v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 942 F.2d 1032,

1038 (6th Cir. 1991))).
'o See infra Part II.
11 See generallyKEVIN F. O'MALLEY ET AL., 1A FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS
§ 12.03 (6th ed. 2015) (listing each circuit court of appeals' jury instruction on stipulations of fact).
12 See infra Part II; seegenerallyO'MALLEY ETAL., supr note 11, § 12.03.
13 Sccinfra Part II.
14 United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 514 (1995) (holding that a criminal jury's constitutional
responsibility is not merely to act as a fact finder but also to apply the law to those facts in making its
determination of guilt or innocence); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (holding
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facts depends not only on the federal judge's interpretation of the law as set forth and
explained in the jury instructions, but also on the judge's determination of whether a
mandatory or permissive jury instruction on stipulations of fact is required. 5 If a
judge finds that a mandatory instruction is necessitated, then it is highly likely, if not
presumed, that a jury will abide by the instruction and accept the stipulation of fact
as conclusively proved.'" If, however, the jury instruction is permissive, then the jury
will consider the stipulation of fact during deliberation and will determine, based on
the stipulation of fact and possibly other evidence, whether the stipulation proves to
be dispositive of the issue. 7 Thus, a federal judge's instruction on stipulations of fact
plays a crucial role in jury deliberation.
The driving force behind variation in instruction on stipulations of fact among
the courts of appeals stems from constitutional considerations. Specifically, when
stipulations of fact comprise elements of the offense, the courts of appeals are
concerned about possible violations of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.'" For
example, one concern is whether a stipulation of fact that is an element of the offense
constitutes a waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury on that element."
Another related issue is the effect a mandatory instruction has on the Sixth
Amendment and a jury's power to nullify.20 These constitutional considerations are
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to provide a right to trial by
impartial jury in criminal cases). The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
" See infra Parts 11-111.
16 See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 798 (1986) ("[T]he theory under which jury
instructions are given by trial courts and reviewed on appeal is that juries act in accordance with the
instructions given [to] them, ... and that they do not consider and base their decisions on legal questions
with respect to which they are not charged.") (citation omitted).
" Additionally, permissive instructions may vary in degrees of strength as well. Purely from a
linguistic perspective, the word "should" carries with it a prescriptive action to be performed or that is
expected to be performed, whereas the word "may" indicates that the jury has the ability to perform, but
that the action connotes discretion.
1s See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509-10 ("The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees that no one will be deprived of liberty without 'due process of law'; and the Sixth, that '[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.'
We have held that these provisions require criminal convictions to rest upon a jury determination that the
defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt."
(footnote omitted) (citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275,277-78 (1993))). Additionally, some courts
of appeals explicitly refuse to address the issue of whether a stipulation of fact that is an element of the
offense violates the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., United States. v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 223 n.2 (1st Cir.
1999) ("[W]e express no opinion on whether the government's duty to prove each element of a crime
beyond a reasonable doubt is diluted impermissibly if the jury instructions do not submit the stipulation
for the jury's consideration. This thorny question has divided the courts of appeals ... ").
1 Compare United States v. Mason, 85 F.3d 471, 472-73 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that the right to
a trial byjury on each element is waived when the defendant voluntarily enters into a stipulation with the
government), with United States v. Muse, 83 F.3d 672, 680-81 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that a court may
not remove a stipulated element from the jury's consideration).
20 See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, John Henry Wigmore, Johnny Lynn Old Chief and "Legitimate
MoralForce"- Keeping the Courtroom Safe forHeartstingsand Gore, 49 HASTINGS LJ. 403,407 n.14
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'

the reasons why circuit courts adopt specific language in their jury instructions on
stipulations of fact. 2
This Note first explores and explicates the split of authority concerning
instructing a jury on stipulations of fact entered into knowingly and voluntarily by
the defendant and government during federal criminal proceedings. Second, this
Note suggests that that the correct jury instruction on stipulations is mandatory,
instructing juries that they must accept stipulated facts as conclusively proved, and
that other circuits should adopt a similar mandatory instruction. Part I provides
background on stipulations, describing what a stipulation is and how it functions in
a federal criminal proceeding. Part II describes the different approaches of the courts
of appeals and the constitutional considerations underlying the varying constructions
of jury instructions on stipulations of fact. Lastly, Part III outlines and argues that
the best approach to constructing a jury instruction on stipulations of fact is the Sixth
Circuit's recently published jury instruction on stipulations of fact, read in
conjunction with the Use Note.2 2
1. TYPES OF STIPULATIONS AND THEIR ROLE DURING LITIGATION
Adversarial parties and courts regard a stipulation as an agreement. 23 Stipulations
occur both in the civil and criminal context and represent agreements either by the
parties and/or their attorneys. 24 The purpose and effect of a stipulation is to conserve
judicial resources, save money and time for all parties involved, and save public
money. 25 Entering into stipulations allows parties to focus only on disputed issues by
allowing them to stipulate to those easily proven and agreed facts that are relevant
26
and necessary to the outcome of the case but would otherwise need to be proved.
Additionally, Judicial resources and public money are saved by the shortening of
trials, and thereby, the clearing of space on the docket. 27 Lastly, stipulations saves
both judges and juries time by enabling them to hear evidence only on those disputed
28
issues.

(1998) (discussing the issue ofjury nullification with a mandatory instruction on stipulations of fact and
issues of intelligibility and rationality for permissive instructions).
21 See infra Part H1.
' See infra note 144, for a description of Use Notes.
2 See generally KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., 22A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
EVIDENCE § 5194 (2d ed. 2016) (defining a stipulation as an agreement made in court).
O'MALLEY ET AL., supra note 11, § 12.03.
24 See generally GRAHAM, supra note 23.

25 FDIC v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 942 F.2d 1032, 1038 (6th Cir. 1991); see also United
States v. Mason, 85 F.3d 471, 475 (10th Cir. 1996) (McKay, J., dissenting) ("Stipulations will still save

prosecutors time and money in the presentation of their cases.").
26

27
28

See St. PaulFire & Manne Ins. Co., 942 F.2d at 1038.
Id
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Stipulations range from agreements relating to matters of evidence to agreements
on specific facts.2 9 Stipulations concerning matters of evidence, for example, typically
include parties entering into an agreement about the admissibility or authenticity of
documents, records, or other exhibits presented in court,3 0 or an evidentiary
stipulation may represent what a specific witness would testify if called."' Stipulations
relating to evidentiary matters are generally not binding on juries.3 2 This is true both
in the criminal and civil context.3 1 Stipulations relating to evidentiary matters are not
considered as conclusive proof of the particular issue for which the evidence is
presented.3 4 Rather, these types of evidentiary stipulations are weighed against all
other evidence in determining whether the government, in a criminal context, or a
plaintiff, in a civil context, has met his or her burden of proof or burden of persuasion
on the issue. 3 s
Stipulations of fact, in contrast, are agreements between the parties that a
particular fact or proposition is true for the purposes of trial." Stipulations of fact
can range from easily proven facts to material facts comprising an element of the
offense.3 1 Stipulations of fact are binding on the parties, court, and on appeal, but, in
29 See GRAHAM,
30 See id.
31 See id

supra note 23, § 5194.

32 See United States v. Mason, 85 F.3d 471, 472 (10th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing
stipulating to facts
from stipulating to evidence and holding that "when ... parties stipulate to evidence tending to establish
an elemental fact, the jury must still resolve the existence or nonexistence of the fact sought to be proved");
United States v. Benally, 756 F.2d 773, 778 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding that it was reversible error for the
district court to instruct the jury that it must accept stipulated testimony as true, reasoning that "a
stipulation as to the testimony a witness would give if called, although it may constitute evidence of the
facts covered, is not an admission of the truth of such testimony and does not prevent a party from
attacking it as he might attack the testimony itself, had it been given." (quoting United States v. Spann,
515 F.2d 579, 582 (10th Cir. 1975))); United States v. Lawson, 682 F.2d 1012, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(stating that a stipulation entered into agreeing to the testimony a witness would have given if called is a
matter of evidence for the jury's consideration).
33 See, e.g., Benally, 756 F.2d at 778 (holding that it is reversible error when a trial court instructs a
jury in a criminal case that an element of the offense has been proved when the stipulation was an
evidentiary stipulation to testimony a witness would have given if called); See generaly KEVIN F.
O'MALLEY ET AL., 3 FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 101:47 (6th ed. 2018) (noting
that there is a difference between stipulating that a witness would give certain testimony-i.e. evidentiary
stipulation- and stipulating that certain facts are established and that stipulations of facts are deemed to
have been conclusively proved and the jury may be instructed accordingly) (citing United States v.
Hellman, 560 F.2d 1235, 1236 (5th Cir. 1977))). It is important to note that the O'Malley complied
circuit instructions tend to cite federal criminal cases for their authority regarding differentiating and
submitting stipulations of fact from evidentiary stipulations. Id
34 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
1s See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
36 See O'MALLEY ET AL., supm note 11, § 12.03.
37 It is important to note that there are boundaries on facts to which parties may stipulate. For
example, it is likely that a judge would reject fact stipulations that are not reasonable or relevant, or are
untrue. See FDIC v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 942 F.2d 1032,1038 n.3 (6th Cir. 1991) ("This is
not to say that the parties could stipulate patently untrue 'facts.' A trial judge may have some authority to
reject stipulations. .. . [I]f the trial court wishes to reject a stipulation, the court must .. . give the parties
notice of its intent, so that the parties will be able to demonstrate the reasonableness of the stipulation.").
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contrast to evidentiary stipulations, courts vary as to how to instruct juries on the
binding nature of stipulations of fact." In the civil context, the circuit courts agree
that stipulations of fact are binding and provide a mandatory instruction stating that
the jury must accept the stipulated fact as proved for purposes of the case."
The answer as to how to instruct juries on the binding nature of stipulations of
fact is not so clear in the federal criminal context. Stipulations of fact are commonly
used in federal criminal cases. Most frequently, the government and defendant
stipulate to the jurisdictional and prior felony conviction elements in cases involving
felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm, which prohibits any person previously convicted
of a felony from possessing, transporting, or receiving any firearm or ammunition in
interstate commerce. 0 Though regarded as binding, the circuit courts of appeals
disagree as to how to properly convey the precise legal effect of a stipulation of fact
to the jury, especially when the stipulated fact comprises an element of the offense."'
Some circuits hold that a proper instruction is a permissive instruction stating that a
42
jury mayor shouldaccept a stipulated fact as proved, while other circuits hold that
3 See infra Part II.
3 Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S.
that have the effect of
661, 677-78 (2010) (stating that "factual stipulations are 'formal concessions ...
withdrawing a fact from issue and dispensing wholly with the need for proof of that fact[,] [and] [t]hus,
a judicial admission ... is conclusive in the case." (quoting K. BROUN, 2 McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §
254 (6th ed. 2006))). See, e.g., THIRD CIR. COMM. ON MODEL CIVILJURY INSTRUCTIONS, MODERN
CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.4 (2017) ("The [parties] have agreed that [set forth stipulated fact or
facts] [is/are] true.. .. You must therefore treat [this fact] [these facts] as having been proved for the
purposes of this case."); COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, DIST. JUDGES ASS'N FIFTH CIR.,
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL CASES) § 2.3 (2016) ("A 'stipulation' is an agreement. When
there is no dispute about certain facts, the attorneys may agree or 'stipulate' to those facts. You must accept
a stipulated fact as evidence and treat that fact as having been proven here in court."); COMM. ON
PATTERN CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIR., FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 2.05 (2017) ("The parties have stipulated, or agreed, that [stipulatedfact].
You must now treat this fact as having been proved for the purpose of this case."); NINTH CIR. JURY
INSTRUCTIONS COMM., MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: FOR THE DISTRICT
COURTS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT § 2.2 (2017) (stating that, when parties agree to certain facts, the jury
should treat these facts as having been proved but also stating in the Comment section that "[w]hen parties
enter into stipulations as to material facts, those facts will be deemed to have been conclusively proved,
and the jury may be so instructed"); see also KEVIN F. O'MALLEY ET AL., 3 FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE
AND INSTRUCTIONS - CIVIL § 102:11 (6th ed. 2016) (providing a general model instruction: "The parties
is a fact. You must treat this fact as having been proven for the
have stipulated, or agreed that
purpose of this case.").

922
(g)(1) (2012); see, e.g., United States v. Ray, 803 F.3d 244, 255-56 (6th Cir.
40 See 18 U.S.C. §
2015) (prior felony elements); United States v. Higdon, 638 F.3d 233, 235 (3d Cir. 2011) (prior felony

conviction and jurisdictional element); United States v. Broadnax, 601 F.3d 336, 339-41 (5th Cir. 2010)

(prior felony element); United States v. Chevere, 378 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (prior felony
element); United States v. Hardin, 139 F.3d 813, 814 (11th Cir. 1998) (prior felony element); United
States v. Mason, 85 F.3d 471, 471 (10th Cir. 1996) (prior felony and jurisdictional elements).
41

See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.

42

See, e.g., United States v. Muse, 83 F.3d 672,677-81 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that a district court's

instruction that the jury must consider all elements of an offense, even those encompassed in stipulations,
was not erroneous, but that thejury shouldfind that the government had proven those stipulated elements)

(emphasis added).
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a proper instruction is one that is mandatory and states that jurors must accept
stipulated facts as true.4 Furthermore, some circuits have failed to address the issue
or have explicitly refused to address the issue when stipulations of fact comprise an

element of the offense."
II. JUDICIAL DETERMINATIONS ON INSTRUCTING JURIES AS TO THE LEGAL
EFFECT OF STIPULATED FACTS

Despite frequent use of stipulations in federal criminal cases and Old Chiefs
holding that it will generally be reversible error to refuse a defendant's stipulation of
fact conceding the prior felony conviction element in felon-in-possession cases, 45
there is still uncertainty among the judiciary and little case law dictating how federal
judges should instruct juries to the existence and legal effect of fact stipulations,
especially when the stipulated fact is an element of the crime. Thus, circuit courts of
appeals
disagree
as
to
what
type
of jury
instruction
is
proper-whether it is appropriate to adopt a mandatory or permissive instruction.
Some courts argue that only a permissive instruction instructing the jury that it may
or should accept stipulated facts as proved can avoid violations of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments," whereas some seem to indicate that, when a defendant stipulates to
a fact comprising an element of the offense, the defendant waives his/her Sixth
Amendment right to a trial jury on that element,47 arguably lending the view that, if
juries are instructed on that element, a mandatory instruction stating that they must
accept stipulated facts as proved would be most proper.
The three circuit courts recurrently cited for their views on instructing juries as
to the existence and legal effect of stipulated facts are the Tenth, Fourth, and Sixth
Circuits. An examination of these three circuits provides a good representation of
the continuum of possibilities and the underlying constitutional considerations
driving the conflicting jury instruction determinations among the circuit courts of
appeals.

43 See, e.g., United States v. Mason, 85 F.3d 471, 472-74 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that defendant's
stipulation as to certain elemental facts of an offense completely removed those elements from the jury's
consideration).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 223 n.2 (1st Cir. 1999) ("[WVe express no opinion
on whether the government's duty to prove each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt is diluted
impermissibly if the jury instructions do not submit the stipulation for the jury's consideration."), United
States v. Jones, 108 F.3d 668, 676 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (Ryan, J., concurring) ("We express no
opinion on the question ofwhether the government and defendant may agree to the removal of an element
from the jury's consideration.").
92 2
4 Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 190-92 (1997); see also 18 U.S.C. §
(g)(1) (2012).
46 See, e.g., Muse, 83 F.3d at 677-81; see abo supra note 19 and accompanying text.
47 United States v. Mason, 85 F.3d 471 (10th Cit. 1996).
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A. The Tenth Circuit's Take on Stipulations ofFact
In United States v. Mason, the Tenth Circuit held that the trial court's jury
instruction removing an element of the offense from the jury's consideration was not
reversible error where the defendant stipulated to that "elemental fact" of the
offense.' In Mason, a jury convicted the defendant of being a felon-in-possessionof-a-firearm.4 9 During the trial, the defendant stipulated to the jurisdictional and
prior felony conviction elements of the felon-in-possession charge.so The stipulation
of facts the defendant entered into admitted that he was previously convicted of a
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year and that the
possession of the firearm was in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.s' These
"elemental" stipulations left the government with the burden of establishing beyond
a reasonable doubt only the element that the defendant knowingly possessed the
firearm described the indictment.52 The trial court's instruction to the jury stated:
"The parties stipulate that the first and third elements have been met .... Therefore,
the government need not offer proof as to these elements, and you should consider
them proven by the government."5 3 The defendant did not object to these
instructions.5 4 Thus, the court of appeals reviewed the jury instructions under a plain
error standard. 5
The Tenth Circuit held that, when a defendant "stipulat[es] to elemental
facts, ... [he] waives his right to a jury trial on that element."56 The court reasoned
that, when a defendant stipulates to the facts that establish an element of the offense,
the defendant voluntarily waives his/her Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial on
that element. 7 The Tenth Circuit stated that to instruct the jury on the effect of the
stipulations establishing elements of the offense as a waiver of the defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights did not constitute a directed verdict on those elements because
"the judge has not removed the consideration of an issue from the jury, the parties
58
have."
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit noted that there was no qualitative difference
between this sort of "partial waiver" and instances where defendants enter into guilty
48

Id. at 472-74.

49

Id. at 471.

51 Seeid.

52 Id. at 471-72.

" Id. at 472 (emphasis added).
4 id.
55 Id.
56 Id.

at 472-73.

s Id. The Tenth Circuit also seems to reject the notion of jury nullification by stating, "While we
recognize that ajury in a criminal case has the practical power to render a verdict at odds with the evidence
or the law, a jury does not have the lawful power to reject stipulated facts .. .. [This] would conflict with
the jurors' swom duty to apply the law to the facts, regardless of outcome." Id. at 473 (citing United States
v. Trujillo, 714 F.2d 102, 105 (11th Cir. 1983)).
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pleas and other sorts of "wholesale waivers" that do not violate the Sixth
Amendment.s 9 Thus, the court held that the jury instructions removing stipulated
elements from the jury's consideration did not constitute plain error because the
defendant waived his constitutional rights to a jury determination of those elements
through fact stipulations.60
The majority opinion in Mason did not specifically address constitutional issues
arising when a trial court fails to ensure that a defendant voluntarily and knowingly
enters into a stipulation of fact. The majority never directly addressed the issue even
though it held that a defendant could waive his Sixth Amendment rights to a trial
by jury and even compared stipulations constituting a waiver to other "wholesale
waivers," like bench trials and guilty pleas,6' where the court does ensure that the
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives his Sixth Amendment Rights.62 The
closest the majority comes to addressing the issue is in a footnote directed toward
the dissenting opinion.6 ' The footnote cites the proposition in Johnson v. Cowley
that "a trial court is not required to engage in an independent inquiry to ensure that
a stipulation to an element is knowing and voluntary."64 Johnson, however, states
that a stipulation of fact of a prior conviction in an enhancement proceeding is not
the functional equivalent of a guilty plea and that the court was not "prepared to hold
in allcases a court receiving such a stipulation must make an independent inquiry to
determine whether the stipulation is voluntarily made with full knowledge of its
65
consequences.s

' Id. at 472-73. The Tenth Circuit also distinguished between fact stipulations establishing an
element ofthe offense and evidentiary stipulations that tend to establish an element of the offense, stating:
"When the only evidence tends to establish an elemental fact, or when the parties stipulate to evidence
tending to establish an elemental fact, the jury must still resolve the existence or nonexistence of the fact
sought to be proved." Id. at 472. Whereas, there is no need to resolve the existence of an element when
parties stipulate to elemental facts. Id; see also United States v. Benally, 746 F.2d 773, 778 (10th Cir.
1985) (holding that instructing a jury to find an elemental fact was "reversible error" when the stipulation
was only to evidentiary facts).
60

61
62
63
64

6

Mason, 85 F.3d at 474.
Id. at 472-73.

See, e.g., Cox v. Hutto, 589 F.2d 394, 396 (8th Cir. 1979).
Id. (citingJohnson v. Cowley, 40 F.3d 341, 346 (10th Cir. 1994)).

d

s Johnson, 40 F.3d at 346 (emphasis added). But see Cox, 589 F.2d at 395-96 (holding that, in a
habitual offender action, the trial court violated the defendant's due process rights by accepting a
stipulation to the defendant's prior conviction without determining whether the defendant understood
and voluntarily consented to the stipulation); United States v. Strother, 578 F.2d 397, 404-05 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (holding that when stipulations are tantamount to a guilty plea, Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure 11-type procedures should apply).
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B. The Fourth Circuit's Take on StipulationsofFact
In United States v. Muse, the Fourth Circuit held that a jury instruction
66
instructing the jury that it shouldconsider an element proved was not plain error.
In Muse, the government charged the defendant with violation of 18 U.S.C.
922
(g)(1), felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm. 67 The defendant and the government
stipulated to the jurisdictional and prior felony conviction elements of the offense."
69
The jury found the defendant guilty of being a felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm.
The defendant appealed, arguing that the judge improperly instructed the jury as to
the effect of stipulations of fact and, thus, functionally directed a verdict for the
prosecution on the jurisdictional and prior felony conviction elements of the felonin-possession offense.7 0 Alternatively, the defendant argued that if the trial judge
properly instructed the jury on the legal effect of stipulated facts, then the trial judge
erred in failing to ensure that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his
Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury on those elements.'
The trial court's instructions read:
[T]he Government must prove each of the following elements beyond a
reasonable doubt .... First, that the defendant was previously convicted
of a felony.... This has been stipulated to; and . .. a stipulation is an
agreement among the parties that this element has been proved or is
proved, and the Government does not have to go any further to prove
that. So, you should not have to concern yourself with that, because the
stipulation establishes that element ... . You should go right past that.
You have to consider it, certainly, as one of the elements, but the
stipulation makes it very clear that you don't have to look into the evidence
to see if it has been proven by the government. The stipulation does that.

Third, that the possession charged was in or affecting interstate
commerce. The third element is again stipulated to between the parties.
So, you don't have to worry yourself about whether or not the gun was in
72
or affecting interstate commerce.
Because the defendant failed to object to the jury instruction at trial, the court of
7
appeals reviewed the instruction under a plain-error standard. 1 The Fourth Circuit
held that the jury instruction was not erroneous by noting its similarities with Eighth
66

67
61
69

United States v. Muse, 83 F.3d 672, 681 (4th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).
I at 674.

Id. at 677-78.
Id. at 674.

oId. at 677-78.
71

Id at 677.

72

Id. at 678 (punctuation in original).

73

Id
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and Ninth Circuit model instructions which strike an "appropriate balance" between
the strong "evidentiary force of a stipulation" and the trial court's inability "to remove
even a stipulated fact from the jury's consideration or to mandate that the jury return
findings as the court directs . .. . The Fourth Circuit began its reasoning by noting
that stipulations of fact are "special" in nature and are "more potent than simply an
admission," such that, when a defendant stipulates to a fact, the defendant waives his
or her right to require the government to produce evidence beyond the stipulation
itself to meet its burden of proof of establishing the fact beyond a reasonable doubt.5
This, the court maintained, is the effect of a stipulation of fact.
Although a stipulation of fact has strong evidentiary force, the court stated that
the prosecution was neither entitled to a directed verdict on the facts comprising
those elements, nor does the defendant effectively plead guilty with respect to any
element of the offense established by the stipulated facts.77 Thus, stipulating to a fact
only relieves the government "of the burden of producing ... evidence" in addition
to the stipulated fact, "it does not relieve the prosecution from . . . 'proving every
element of the crime' beyond a reasonable doubt." Consequently, the trial court
could not remove the stipulated facts comprising an element of the offense from the
jury's consideration by "enter[ing] its own finding that the element [had] been
established." 7 ' Doing so, the court added, would "violate the 'very foundation of the
jury system."'o
The Fourth Circuit based its rationale on the Sixth Amendment. When a
defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the Sixth Amendment requires the jury to reach
the "requisite finding of 'guilty."'8" Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit stated that, for a
guilty verdict to be valid under the Constitution, a jury must consider the stipulation
of fact as evidence of the existence of the element during its deliberation and render
a decision finding that the government has met its burden of proof on every element
of the offense, including those established by stipulations of fact.82 Not only does a
defendant have a constitutional right to trial by an impartial jury, but a jury also has

74

7s

Id. at 680.
Id. at 678.

76id

Id. at 679.
" Id. Here, the Court points the reader to Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991), in support of the
proposition that the prosecution is not relieved of its burden when a defendant stipulates to facts
comprising an element of the crime. Id. This Supreme Court case states that the prosecution's burden of
proof, to prove the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, "is not relieved by a defendant's
tactical decision not to contest an essential element of the offense." Estele, 502 U.S. at 69.
79 Muse, 83 F.3d at 679-80.
80 Id. at 679 (quoting United States v. Gilliam, 994 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 927 (1993)).
s" Id. (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993) (citation omitted)); see also United
States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 522-23 (1995) ("The Constitution gives a criminal defendant the right
to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, his guilt of every element of the crime with which
he is charged.").
82 Muse, 83 F.3d at 679-80.
17
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an "'undisputed power' to nullify guilty verdicts."" Thus, limiting the extent to which
the jury's province can be invaded is also partially based on this "undisputed
[nullification] power," which permits a jury to "bring in a verdict in the teeth of both
law and facts."8 4 Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit held that the trial court's jury
instruction "was not erroneous" and did not amount to a directed verdict on elements
of the offense because the trial court explicitly "instruct[ed] .. . the jury that it must
'consider"' each element of the offense and that it should accept stipulated facts as
proved. 5
Because the instructions were not erroneous, the Fourth Circuit declined to
address the defendant's alternative argument that the trial court erred in not ensuring
that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered into stipulations of fact
comprising elements of the offense.' But, in dictum, the court indicated that
constitutional issues would likely arise in instances where a defendant stipulated to
all elements of an offense." The Fourth Circuit explained that, in those instances,
"the knowing and voluntary nature of [the defendant]'s entry into stipulations
(amounting effectively to a de facto guilty plea) would raise more significant
concerns."88 The Fourth Circuit dodged the issue of the potential need for Rule 11
Id. at 680 (citing United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1006 (4th Cir. 1969)).
Id. (quoting Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920)).
sId. at 681.

8

86

id.

8 See id.

" Id.; ct United States v. Wellington, 417 F.3d 284, 291 (2d Cir. 2005) (cautioning district judges
that "where a court accepts a defendant's stipulation to the elements of the charged offense, the district
judge must ensure (1) that the stipulation is voluntarily made and (2) that the defendant understands the
consequences of his stipulation"); United States v. Lyons, 898 F.2d 210, 214-15 (1st Cit. 1990) (holding
that the panoply of procedures required in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 are not required when
stipulating to facts that establish the crime, but that trial judge should inquire as to whether stipulations
were entered into voluntarily and with knowledge (citing United States v. Strother, 578 F.2d 397, 404
(D.C. Cit. 1978))); United States v. Stalder, 696 F.2d 59, 62 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that although "an
inquiry as thorough as that prescribed by [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11] is not required before
the district court accepts a stipulation of facts establishing guilt from a criminal defendant," (quoting
United States v. Lawriw, 568 F.2d 98, 105 n.13 (8th Cir. 1977)) the court should ensure the defendant
understood the rights being surrendered as a result of signing the stipulations); Witherspoon v. United
States, 633 F.2d 1247, 1251-52 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 is
not required in instances when a defendant stipulates to most or all of the factual elements of an offense
but "suggest[ing] to the District Courts that they consider the possible applicability of the terms of Rule
11 in any instance where a stipulation as to most or all of the factual elements necessary to proof of guilt
of a crime is tendered [, and] [i]f applicable, the strictures of the rule should be followed"); United States
v. Strother, 578 F.2d 397, 404 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that although Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11 is inapplicable to stipulations to elemental facts, "the trial judge should arguably be at some
special pains to satisfy himself that the defendant is fully informed about precisely what it is that he is
giving up;" and parts of Rule 11 are helpful in ensuring the defendant understands the significance of
stipulations to elements of the offense); United States v. Brown, 428 F.2d 1100, 1102-04 (D.C. Cit.
1970) (holding that despite the inapplicability of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 to situations
where a defendant stipulates to all elements of an offense but reserves the defense of insanity, courts should
follow its procedure of addressing the defendant personally to assure stipulations are made voluntarily and
knowingly).
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type procedures, stating that, because the defendant in this case stipulated only to
two elements and not all three elements of the offense, they need not address the
issue.8 9
C. The Sixth Circuit's Take on Stipulations ofFact
The Sixth Circuit has changed its stance on how to instruct juries on the binding
nature of stipulations of fact. The Sixth Circuit case on stipulations of fact recurrently
cited in other circuits is United States v. Jones."o In Jones, a jury convicted the
defendant for being a felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm.91 The defendant and
government entered into a stipulation of fact that the defendant was "a prior
convicted felon for the purposes of [the] trial." 2 Before deliberation, the judge
instructed the jury as to the legal effect of the stipulation of fact. The instruction
read:
The first element you must find beyond a reasonable doubt before you can
convict the defendant is that the defendant had been convicted of a felony
.... To satisfy the first element, you need only find that the defendant
was, in fact, convicted of a felony and the conviction was prior to the
receipt or possession of the firearm charged in this case. Defendant admits
that he was convicted of a felony prior to the date alleged in the
indictment, so this element of the offense has been proven. Since
defendant admits that he was previously convicted of a felony, you will
-ind that the government has estabhshed this element of the
offense .... 93

The defendant did not object to the instruction, and the Sixth Circuit reviewed
the decision for plain error.94 The majority of eight judges sitting en banc declined
to decide whether the challenged jury instruction was error and decided the case on

' Muse, 83 F.3d at 681. After the ruling in Old Chiefv. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997), the
Fourth Circuit stated, "[W]e question the validity of our holding in United States v. Muse, 83 F.3d 672
(4th Cir. 1996) that a stipulation does not constitute a waiver of the government's burden of proof in the
limited circumstances of a defendant's felon status for purposes of a 18 U.S.C.A § 9 2 2 (g)(1) charge....
[But, in this case,] we need not address whether the necessary result of the holding of Old Chieis the
elimination of the Government's burden of proof of a defendant's felon status in a § 9 2 2 (g)(1) charge
when the defendant has entered into a stipulation to that effect." United States v. Jackson, 124 F.3d 607,
617 n.8 (4th Cir. 1997). This seems to indicate that the Fourth Circuit has not definitively ruled out
whether it is constitutional to provide a mandatory instruction to the jury concerning stipulations of fact
that comprise an element of the crime.
9o United States v. Jones, 108 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc). See United States v. Cornish, 103
F.3d 302, 305-06 (3d Cir. 1997); U.S. v. Gonzalez, 110 F.3d 936, 948 (2d Cir. 1997) United States v.
Mason, 85 F.3d 471, 472-74 (10th Cir. 1996).
91
Jones, 108 F.3d at 670.
92 id.
" Id. (alteration in original).
94
d.
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narrower grounds.95 The majority assumed error and concluded that, if any error did
exist in the district court's instruction, it was not plain error, reasoning that because
"[lhere is only sparse case law ... and what little case law exists is divergent and
conflicting[,]" any error resulting from the district court's instruction on stipulations
96
of fact was not plain.
Although the majority of judges sitting en banc declined to address whether the
instructions to jury were error, a minority of six concurring judges addressed the
question." The Sixth Circuit's concurring judges stated that, in their view, the jury
instruction constituted "constitutional plain error." The concurring judges found
that instructing jurors that "you will find that the government has established one of
the elements of the offense" constituted plain error.99 In making the determination
of constitutional plain error, the court differentiated the following statements: (1)
"[d]efendant admits that he was convicted of a felony prior to the date alleged ... so
this element of the offense has been proven"' and (2) "[s]ince defendant admits that
5
he was previously convicted of a felony, you willFnd'o that the element of the
offense has been proven. The concurring six judge minority seemed to adopt the view
that instructing the jury that an element of the offense has been proven is proper
where the defendant has affirmatively stipulated to the fact comprising the element
10 2
because the government's burden of proving that fact is relieved. But, according to
the concurring judges, when a district court judge instructs the jury as to what they
"will find," the judge essentially directs a verdict against the defendant on that
element of the offense.10 This is so because the judge not only relieves the
government of its burden of offering evidence on the stipulated fact but makes a
finding that "the stipulation has effectively proved the stipulated fact beyond a
04
reasonable doubt," instructing "the jurors [that they] 'will' so find."1 Such an action
by the trial court then arguably violates a defendant's Fifth Amendment right to due
process and Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.10s

's Id. at 671 ("We decline to decide at this time whether the instruction challenged here was error.
Rather we choose to decide the case on narrower grounds and will assume error . . . .") (citation omitted).
96

Id. at 671-73.

97 See id at 673-77 (Ryan, J., concurring).

9' Id. at 673.
99

10

d

Id.
'0' Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104

at 674-75 (alteration in original).
at 673 (alteration in original).
at 674-75.
at 675-76.

Id. at 675.

Id. at 675-676; see also United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509-10 (1995) ("The Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that no one will be deprived of liberty without
'due process of law'; and the Sixth, that 'in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.' We have held that these provisions require criminal
convictions to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime
with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt." (citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 27778 (1993))).
1os
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In support of this opinion, the concurrence discussed United States v. Mentzo1 6
In Mentz, the government submitted uncontested evidence in support of an element
of the offense, and the district judge instructed the jury that the government had
proven the element.' 07 The Sixth Circuit held that the judge invaded the jury's
province by "improperly cast[ing] himself in the role of trier of fact" and applying the
law to the facts he had determined. 0 8 This amounted to a directed verdict on an
essential element of the crime and, thus, violated the defendant's Fiftho' and Sixth
Amendment rights." 0
The concurring minority in Jones, taking into account the constitutional
considerations outlined in Mentz and other Supreme Court precedent,"' reasoned
that, in order to prevent a directed verdict against the defendant, and consequently,
violations of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, a jury instruction on stipulations of
fact should state that "those facts maybe considered proved by the government.012
According to the concurring judges, this type of permissive instruction holds the
government accountable to its duty of proving every element of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt and permits the jury to make the requisite finding of guilty on each
element of the crime. 1' 3 This, the concurring judges noted, also serves the function
of preserving the jury's power to nullify a verdict." 4 Thus, the Sixth Circuit judges
who addressed the issue of how to properly instruct juries on stipulations of fact in
Jones arguably concluded that a permissive instruction is appropriate to assure
constitutionality."s
1'6
17

SeeJones, 108 F.3d at 674-75; United States v. Mentz, 840 F.2d 315 (6th Cir. 1988)).
See Mentz, 840 F.2d at 318-19.

108

Id. at 320.
See id. at 319 n.4.

'09

no Id. at 323.
n. See generaifJones, 108 F.3d at 673-77; see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993)
(stating that it is a defendant's constitutional "right to have [a] jury, rather than [a] judge, reach the
requisite finding of 'guiltyL,]'" and, thus, a district court judge "may not direct a verdict for the State, no
matter how overwhelming the evidence"); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 69 (1991) ("[T]he
prosecution's burden to prove every element of the crime is not relieved by a defendant's tactical decision
not to contest an essential element of the offense."); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)
(stating that the right to trial byjury in criminal cases is "fundamental to the American scheme ofjustice");
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1977) (holding that a verdict for the
prosecution may never be directed no matter how strong the evidence is against the defendant).
112 See Jones, 108 F.3d at 674 (original emphasis
altered).
113 See id. at 674-75.
114 Id. at 676. In response to the majority opinion in UnitedStates v. Mason, 85 F.3d 471 (10th Cit.
1996), the six concurring judges inJonesstated, "We ... are disturbed by the discomforting reality ofjury
nullification.... However, even if a jury does not have the lawful authority'tobring in a verdict in the
teeth of both law and facts,' it unquestionably has the powerto do so."Jones, 108 F.3d at 676 (alteration
in original) (quoting Homing v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920)). Thus, an underlying
constitutional consideration for the Sixth Circuit concurrence on instructing juries on stipulations of fact
is undoubtedlyjury nullification.
us Id at 674-76. The six minority concurring judges in Jones also "expressled] no opinion on the
question ofwhether the government and defendant may agree to the removal of an element from the jury's
consideration," but stated it was "indisputably clear that there was no such agreement in this case[,]"
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Both the majority and concurring opinions in Jones, however, failed to
acknowledge previous Sixth Circuit precedent directly addressing the issue of
whether a defendant may enter into stipulations of fact that comprise an element of
the offense. In Witherspoon v. United States, a trial court convicted the defendant
116
of being a felon-in-possession-of-a firearm. The defendant stipulated to the facts
comprising each element of the crime but asserted the unconstitutionality of the
statute, as applied to the stipulated facts." The district court judge concluded that
the statutes were "constitutionally valid" as applied to the stipulated facts and that
"since the defendant . . . stipulated to all of the elements of the offense, and the
stipulation of all of the elements to the offense constitutes what I would consider to
18
be a person's guilt, I find the defendant guilty of the charge . . . ."'
The defendant appealed, asserting that, by stipulating to facts comprising each
element of the crime, Rule 11 procedures were required to ensure that he knowingly
and voluntarily waived a trial byjury on all elements of the crime."' The Sixth Circuit
did not hold that a defendant could not stipulate to any or all facts comprising
elements of the crime. But, the Sixth Circuit did observe that while Rule 11 did not
by its terms apply to the case at hand because the defendant did not offer a plea of
guilt, a district court judge should consider the possible applicability of the terms of
Rule 11 when a defendant stipulates to most or all of the facts comprising an element
of the offense in order to ensure that the defendant understands the legal effect of
20
stipulations of fact-a waiver of a jury trial on those elements of the offense.' Thus,
Sixth Circuit precedent does seem to indicate that a defendant may enter stipulations
of fact comprising elements of the crime and that, in some instances, it is advisable
to implement Rule 11 procedures to ensure the defendant understands any
2
constitutional rights he or she may be waiving.1
By comparison, in United States v Giifith, the Sixth Circuit reversed a
conviction due to an erroneous jury instruction on stipulations of fact.1 2 2 In Griffith,
the government charged the defendant with transmitting threatening
noting that such an agreement would likely require the defendant to "give up much more than he wittingly
bargained for if [the court found] that his stipulation to the fact of a prior conviction constituted a waiver
of his rights to a jury trial and to due process." Id. at 676.
16
1 Witherspoon v. United States, 633 F.2d 1247, 1248 (6th Cir. 1980).
117 id.
us Id. at 1250.
u' Id. at 1251; see alsoFED.R. CRiM. P. 11 (detailing procedural requirements for pleas).
120 Witherspoon, 633 F.2d at 1251-52. In citing another circuit court's opinion, the Sixth Circuit
also seemed to indicate that not all Rule 11 procedures would be necessary or appropriate in all cases but
that, in some cases, it would be helpful in impressing upon the defendant the significance of his choice to
enter stipulations of fact. See id. (quoting United States v. Strother, 578 F.2d 397, 404-05 (D.C. Cir.
1978)).
u2 See United States v. Hicks, 495 F. App'x 633, 643-44 (6th Cir. 2012) (comparing Sixth Circuit
precedent and suggesting that Rule 11 procedures may be required in instances where a defendant
stipulates to all of the elements of an offense or otherwise reduces the government's burden of proof such
that the stipulation amounts to a de facto guilty plea).
122 United States v. Griffith, No. 92-6106, 1993 WL 492299, at *3 (6th Cir. Nov. 29, 1993).
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communications.' 23 During the trial, the defendant and government entered into a
stipulation of fact regarding the defendant's mental capacity.1 24 Specifically, the
stipulation stated that the defendant "did suffer from a severe mental disease or defect
which rendered her unable to appreciate the nature, quality, or wrongfulness of her
acts."' 25 The jury instruction as to the fact stipulation admitted read:
A stipulation is an agreement between the parties that there is no factual
dispute as to the matter. Both parties agree that this fact is true, ....
[A]s with any other fact in evidence in this case, you may give this such
weight as you believe it deserves in arriving at your verdicts in this case.
However, you shouldconsider this fact as a matter of evidence in the case
as if it had been proved by a witness presented by both parties....
There is no factual dispute with respect to that item, and it is an item of
evidence that you mayconsider in reaching your verdicts in this case; but
the weight you give it is, as with all matters of evidence in this case, is [sic]
up to you.1

26

The defendant did not object to the jury instructions.1 27 The appeals court,
reviewing the district court's instruction for plain error, explained that "[t]he law in
the Sixth Circuit on the effect of a stipulation of fact is clear: 'Stipulations voluntarily
entered by the parties are binding, both on the district court and on the appeals
court."1 2 8 The Sixth Circuit held that "once the district court accepted the binding
stipulation of fact that proved the [necessary] elements of the insanity defense, that
defense had been made out as a matter of law."' 2 9 As such, the Sixth Circuit stated
that the jury had nothing to resolve about the defense.' 3 0
Because the insanity defense was proven as a matter of law, the district court
erred in telling "the jury it could weigh the evidence as to the defendant's insanity."
The Sixth Circuit specified that district court should have instructed the jury that if
it determined the defendant had satisfied the elements of the crime, then the jury
was "required to return a verdict of 'not guilty by reason of insanity.' 1 3 2 The Sixth
Circuit explained that the stipulation of facts proving the elements of the insanity
defense prevented the jury from returning a verdict of "guilty."
Thus, in

123
124
125
126
127
128
129

Id. at *1.
Id
id.
Id. at *1-*2 (emphasis added).
Id. at *2.
Id. (quoting FDIC v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 942 F.2d 1032, 1038 (6th Cir. 1991)).
Id. at *3.

13o Id.
131 Griffth, 1993
132
133

Id at *3.
id.

WL 492299, at *2.
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comparison to the concurrence in United States v. Jones, which seems to arguably
support the use of a permissive jury instruction with regard to stipulated facts, in
35
Griffith,'3 4 the Sixth Circuit appears to arguably adopt a mandatory instruction.'

III. MANDATORYJURY INSTRUCTIONS ON STIPULATIONS OF FACT ARE THE
BEST APPROACH FOR INSTRUCTING JURIES
With no definitive precedent from the Supreme Court and no consensus among
the circuit courts of appeals, the question remains as to how federal district courts
should properly instruct juries on the binding nature of stipulations of fact. The
previously discussed Tenth, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits' views provide a good
representation of the continuum of possibilities on instructing juries on stipulated
facts.13 6 Each circuit's view is based on the constitutional considerations of the Fifth
Amendment's guarantee of due process of law and the Sixth Amendment's guarantee

' Id.; United States v. Jones, 108 F.3d 668, 674-75 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (Ryan,J., concurring).
Although not necessarily proffered as a view here, one way of approaching this concurring opinion in
Jones is the to view the concurring opinion as seeming to arguably adopt a permissive instruction because
it states that ajudge may instruct ajury that stipulated facts may be considered proved by the government,
consequently relieving the government's burden of proof on that stipulated fact. Id. This means that the
government is not required to offer any additional proof other than the stipulated fact itself. Id. Thus,
although a fact stipulation may have the effect of providing proof beyond a reasonable doubt in virtue of
the existence of the stipulated facts that compose an element, the juryis still ultimately determines whether
the element itself is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (citing United States v. Muse, 83 F.3d 672,
679-80 (4th Cir. 1996)). In this case, it just so happens that the stipulated fact is an elemental fact in that
the stipulated fact is that the defendant had a prior felony conviction. Id. at 673. Thus, arguably, from
this point of view, it is not inconsistent when the concurring opinion then goes on to say that it is not an
error to state that "this element of the offense has been proven" because the government's burden of proof
has been relieved as to the prior felony conviction element. In comparing this instruction with United
States v. Mentz, 840 F.2d 15, (6th Cir. 1988), the diference is that the burden of proof is relieved in
Jonesbecause the stipulation is a stipulation of fact, whereas the burden of proof in Mentzwas not relieved
because it was uncontested evidence that the trial judge used to support a jury instruction that the element
was proven. Jones, 109 F.3d, at 674-75. Ultimately in Jones, then, although a stipulation relieves the
government of its obligation to produce additional evidence to establish the stipulated facts beyond a
reasonable doubt, and may have the effect of providing proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury itself
will consider the stipulation of fact and determine whether the government proved the each element of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. It is unclear as to whether this alternative reading is correct because
the concurring opinion seems difficult to apprehend the exact meaning of the opinion being offered.
However, arguably either of these views are defensible in light of the language of the opinion.
135 See also United States v. Vaughn, 12 F. App'x 188, 191-92 (6th Cir. 2000) (comparing present
facts and jury instructions to those in Jones and holding no plain error where district court judge stated
during voir dire that "the government need not offer proof on these two elements, and you should consider
them proven by the government[,] and at close of the trial that 'you may consider two of the elements
proven by the government'").
1' See supraPart II. Although the Tenth and Fourth Circuits are frequently cited for their opinions
on stipulations of fact, neither circuit has adopted federal criminal pattern jury instructions. In contrast,
the Sixth Circuit adopted an instruction on stipulations of fact in August 2016. See SIXTH CIR. COMM.
ON PATrERN CRIVIINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 7.21
(2017) [hereinafter SIXTH CIRCUIT PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS].
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in criminal cases of a trial by impartial jury.' Given that stipulations of facts in
federal criminal trials are voluntary, affirmative, and binding agreements between the
government and the defendant that a certain fact is true,' 8 arguably a mandatory
instruction on stipulations of fact is not only most appropriate but is also
constitutional.
A mandatory instruction is constitutional because the underlying premise behind
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments is to protect the defendant in a criminal trial from
oppression by the government through "corrupt or overzealous prosecutor[s]" or the
"complaint, biased, or eccentric judge."' If a defendant and the government enter
into an agreement over a specific fact in the case, not only is the fact undisputed, but
the truth of the proposition has been voluntarily and affirmatively made by both
litigating parties." In some instances, the defendant expressly requests a mandatory
instruction on the stipulations of fact."' Because the purposes of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments are to protect the defendant from an "oppressive government,"42 it is
difficult to perceive how a mandatory instruction on a stipulation of fact, voluntarily,
knowingly, and affirmatively entered into by the defendant with the government,
constitutes a violation of the defendant's constitutional guarantees. Given these
constitutional considerations, not only is there arguably no constitutional violation
in providing a mandatory instruction, but a mandatory instruction also preserves the
binding nature of the stipulations of fact and the reasons litigating parties stipulate
certain facts.i4 As such, a mandatory instruction is the best approach to instructing
juries to stipulated facts.
137

See supra Part II.

us See supra PartI.
139 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
140 There is arguably a fundamental difference in affirmatively stipulating to facts and the failure to
contest an element of the offense. In instances involving a "defendant's tactical decision not to contest an
essential element of the offense," the government is not relieved of its burden of proof to prove every

element of the offense charged. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 69-70 (1991). In Old Chiefv. United
States, Justice O'Connor stated that when a defendant pleads "not guilty" to an offense, the prosecution
still has the burden of proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt and that a defendant's decision
not to contest an element of the offense does not remove the prosecution's burden on that element. 519
U.S. 172, 199-200 (1997) (O'Connor,J., dissenting). Further, she noted that, following these principles,
"a defendant's stipulation to an element of an offense does not remove that element from the jury's
consideration." Id at 200. But, as demonstrated above, the constitutional considerations underlying
Estelle v. McGuire and other Supreme Court precedents is to safeguard the defendant against an
oppressive government. In instances where a defendant stipulates to facts (or even an element), the
defendant is not simply failing to contest (omitting to act) but, rather, the defendant is affirmatively
agreeing that a stipulated fact is true. Arguably, this affirmative act of stipulating to the truth of
propositions is fundamentally different than omitting to act at all. See alo Risinger, supra note 20, at
451-53 (discussingJustice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Old Chiefand discussing the appropriateness
of a permissive versus mandatory jury instruction on stipulations of fact).
141 See, e.g., Old Chief 519 U.S. at 174-77 (explaining procedural posture of how the defendant
requested that the Court instruct the jury that he had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by
imprisonment exceeding one year).
142 See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155.
13 See supra Part I.
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Specifically, the Sixth Circuit's recently adopted mandatory instruction, read in
conjunction with the Use Note,1' is the best approach to instructing juries on the
legal effect of stipulations of fact. The Sixth Circuit's criminal jury instruction on
stipulations of fact reads: "The government and the defendant have agreed, or
stipulated, to certain facts. Therefore, you must accept the following stipulated facts
as proved: [insert facts stipulateJ."14 ' The Use Note to the Sixth Circuit's
stipulations instruction reads: "When the stipulated facts establish an element of the
crime, the best practice is for the stipulation to be in writing and signed by the
defendant and counsel." 1
The Sixth Circuit's jury instruction on stipulations is currently the best approach
on instructing juries as to the binding nature of stipulations of fact because it is a
mandatory instruction in that it dictates that a jury must accept a stipulated fact as
proved. This mandatory instruction expresses how stipulations are binding on the
parties, court, and on appeal, while also allowing parties to dispose of necessary but
undisputed facts, which, in turn, saves judicial resources, public money, and time.'4 7
The Sixth Circuit's Use Note addresses the possible constitutional issues arising
when stipulations of fact comprise an element of the crime by suggesting that the
"best practice" is to have a "stipulation [of fact] . .. in writing and signed by [both]
48
the defendant and counsel."1
Because stipulations are agreements as to the truth of proposed facts for purposes
of trial, additional language inserted into the Sixth Circuit's criminal pattern jury
instruction indicating that the facts are true would reinforce the binding nature of
stipulations. It is the truth of stipulated facts that arguably necessitates a mandatory
instruction. 14 An instruction including the suggested language would state
something like: "The government and defendant have stipulated that [fact] is true.
5
Therefore, you must accept [stipulated fact] as proved."1o

14 Use Notes typically follow jury instructions and briefly explain issues relating to the instructions.
See, e.g., SIXTH CIRCUIT PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, Introduction
("Use Notes following the instructions briefly explain when bracketed language should be used and other
issues relating to the instructions.").
145
146

Id. § 7.21 (first emphasis added).

Id.
147 See supranotes 25-29 and accompanying text.
14
8 SIXTH CIRCUIT PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, § 7.21.
149 Some may disagree and argue that this is simply "splitting hairs," but precise language and the
import of that language is important from a linguistic standpoint because sometimes words have two
meanings. For example, if instead a fact were viewed as undisputed or uncontested, that would connote
that there was no disagreement about the fact but would not necessarily indicate that the fact was true.
To avoid any confusion and to properly convey the binding nature of stipulations of fact, it is arguably
necessary to include that the fact is considered true for purposes of the trial.
"s See SIXTH CIRCUIT PATTERN CRIMINALJURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, § 7.21.
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As a comparison, the First Circuit's jury instruction on evidence and inferences
is a mandatory instruction that includes a statement indicating the truth value of the
stipulated fact. Specifically, the First Circuit's criminal pattern jury instruction states:
The evidence from which you are to decide what the facts are consists of
... any facts to which the lawyers have agreed or stipulated. A stipulation
means simply that the government and defendant accept the truth of a
particular proposition or fact. Since there is no disagreement, there is no
need for evidence apart from the stipulation. You must accept the
stipulation as fact to be given whatever weight you choose."s1
The strength of the First Circuit's jury instruction is the imported language
indicating that the litigating parties accept as true a particular proposition or fact.
The weakness is that the instruction goes on to state that the stipulation of fact is "to
be given whatever weight you choose," arguably undermining the binding nature of
a stipulation of fact. Additionally, the First Circuit includes no Use Notes or
committee commentary15 2 for guidance. Thus, because the Sixth Circuit adopts a
mandatory instruction and provides Use Notes to protect a defendant's constitutional
importing language
rights, their jury instruction is superior. Furthermore,
establishing the truth of the stipulations of fact would further strengthen the Sixth
Circuit's instruction.
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit jury instruction would arguably be strengthened
by including, in the committee commentary, Sixth Circuit precedent explicitly
addressing constitutional guarantees with respect to instances wherein a defendant
stipulates to facts comprising the elements of the offense. For example, the Eighth
Circuit's mandatory instruction on stipulations of fact incorporates references to and
excerpts from case law that thoroughly explicate the constitutional issues surrounding
stipulations of fact.' Specifically, the Eight Circuit committee commentary on
stipulations indicates that "[w]hen facts which tend to establish guilt are submitted
on stipulation, the court must determine whether the consequences of the admissions
are understood by the defendant and whether he consented to them"'5 4 and that
"when a stipulation is entered that leaves no fact to be tried, the court should
151 PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE FIRST
CIRCUIT § 3.04 (2017) [hereinafter FIRST CIRCUIT PATrERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS].
152 Committee Commentaries typically "cite the authority for the instruction and explain
the
Committee's rationale." SIXTH CIRCUIT PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136,
Introduction.
1s The Eight Circuit's instruction on stipulations of fact states: "The [government] [prosecution] and
the defendant[s] have stipulated-that is, they have agreed-that certain facts are as counsel have just
stated. You must therefore treat those facts as having been proved." JUDICIAL COMM. ON MODELJURY
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EIGHTH CIR., MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR
THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT § 2.03 (2014) [hereinafter EIGHTH CIRCUIT
PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS]. Unlike the Sixth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit instruction
does not include a Use Note explaining and advising the judge on issues relating to stipulations of fact.

' Id. (citing Cox v. Hutto, 589 F.2d 394, 396 (8th Cir. 1979)).
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determine that the stipulation was voluntarily and intelligently entered into, and that
55
the defendant knew and understood the consequences of the stipulation."' Thus,
by including references and explicit excerpts of Eight Circuit case law, the committee
commentary provides explicit assurance that district courts will knowingly safeguard
defendants' constitutional rights.
One example of Sixth Circuit precedent that could be inserted in the Sixth
56
Circuit's Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions is Witherspoon v. United States.' As
explained in Part II above, in Witherspoon, the Sixth Circuit suggested to district
courts that "they consider the possible applicability of the terms of Rule 11 in any
instance where a stipulation as to most or all of the factual elements necessary to
proof of guilt of a crime is tendered."s' Further, the Sixth Circuit noted that
incorporating applicable Rule 11 procedures would ensure that a defendant
understands the legal effect of stipulations of fact-that a stipulation of fact
comprising elements of the offense constitutes a waiver of the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a trial by jury on those elements.'s Incorporating Witherspoon
into the committee commentary would strengthen the Sixth Circuit's jury instruction
on stipulations of fact because it would explicate the reason for the Use Note's
suggestion that the best practice for stipulations of fact is that they be in writing and
signed by the defendant and counsel-protecting a defendant's constitutional rights.
CONCLUSION
Stipulations of fact are frequently utilized in federal criminal cases and range from
undisputed, immaterial facts that are easily proven to elements of the offense. In spite
of their routine use, there is no Supreme Court guidance or consensus among the
circuit courts of appeals as to how to accurately and effectively instruct juries on the
legal effect of stipulations of fact voluntarily and knowingly entered into by a
defendant and the government during a trial proceeding. Interpretations of the
requirements of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are the driving force behind
variations in instructions, resulting primarily in three different possibilities on how
to instruct juries. The Tenth Circuit case law adopts the view that a stipulation of
fact comprising an element of the offense amounts to a waiver of trial by jury on the
stipulated element."' The Fourth Circuit adopts the position that the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments require the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every
element of the offense when a defendant pleads "not guilty," and, therefore, that a
permissive instruction is proper to ensure submission of every element of the offense
60
to the jury for its consideration.1 The Sixth Circuit case law has been vagarious over
Id. (citing United States v. Stalder, 696 F.2d 59, 62 (8th Cir. 1982)).
Witherspoon v. United States, 633 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir. 1980).
157 Id. at 1252.
"ss
156

1s' Id. at

1251-52.
See discussion supm Section II.A.
160 See discussion supra Section II.B.
1s'
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the years, but the case law and Sixth Circuit Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions
indicate that the prevailing view is that a mandatory instruction is proper.161
When a defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and affirmatively enters into an
agreement with the government as to the truth of a proposition or fact, a mandatory
instruction on that stipulated fact is proper to ensure preservation of the binding
nature of the stipulation. Additionally, as explicated and argued above, when a
defendant voluntarily and knowingly enters into a stipulation of fact, there is no
violation of the defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights because the
voluntariness and knowledge of the defendant guards against oppression by the
government through "corrupt or overzealous prosecutor[s]" or the "complaint,
biased, or eccentric judge." 1 62
Thus, the Sixth Circuit's jury instruction on stipulations of fact is an
effective option for providing clarity to other circuits because it is mandatory,
ensuring that the binding nature of stipulations is maintained, and because the Use
Note provides guidance and guarantees that safeguard a defendant's constitutional
rights.1 6 ' Furthermore, the suggestions discussed in Part III would arguably
strengthen the Sixth Circuit's jury instructions by explicitly indicating that the facts
agreed to are true for purposes of the trial and by elucidating constitutional concerns
through inclusion of Sixth Circuit precedent directly addressing cases involving
stipulations of fact comprising most or all elements of the offense.

16

See discussion supra Section II.C.

1162
63

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
SXTH CIRCUIT PATTERN CRIMINALJURY INSTRUCTIONS, supr note 136, § 7.21.

